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THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN ACTION
ROSCOE POUND
I. APPLICATION OF LEGAL PRECEPTS'
A. ANALYSIS OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS.-Many years ago2 I
distinguished as follows the steps which are involved in the decision
of a case according to law: "(1) Finding the facts, i.e., ascertaining
the state of facts to which legal precepts are to be applied in order to
reach a determination; (2) finding the law, i.e., ascertaining the legal
precept or precepts applicable to the facts found; (3) interpreting the
precept or precepts to be applied, i.e., ascertaining their meaning by
genuine interpretation,3 and (4) applying the precept or precepts so
found and interpreted to the case in hand.
"Finding the law often requires finding by applying the authorita-
tive technique to the authoritative guides to decision in order to de-
velop a precept by analogy. Hence it runs into a lawmaking function
and may involve 'a judgment as to the relative worth and importance
of competing legislative grounds.'4 Even where choice of starting
points is determined by a received ideal which is itself part of the law,
the process of apprehending and using it may be in substance legisla-
tive in character. Likewise interpretation on one side runs into law-
making, and so the judicial function runs into the legislative function
at this point also." On the other side, interpretation runs into applica-
tion and so the judicial function runs into the administrative."
Theories of judicial decision may be worked out for decision at
first instance or for decisions of courts of review (which make prece-
dents) or for both, or may be directed to the law-finding or law-
declaring function of appellate courts, or to the judicial process as a
whole. Huntington Cairns has given an interesting discussion of four
theories.5 Bacon, who as Chancellor, sat at first instance in the Court
of Chancery and as one of the judges of first instance in the Court of
Star Chamber at a time when equity had not yet been systematized
and the law of misdemeanors administered in the Star Chamber was
RoscoE POUND is University Professor Emeritus, Harvard University, A.B.,
Nebraska, 1888, A.M., 1889, Ph.D., 1897.
1 1 have discussed this at some length in RECENT DEVELOPmENTS n- ra LAW or
EQUITY OF INTEREST TO THE PRAcTrsinG LAwYER (Cleveland Bar Assoc., 1933).
2 The Theory of Judi dal Decision, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 945-946 (1923).
3 2 Austin, JURIsPaRUDENCE 989-991 (5th ed., London, 1885).
4 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 466 (1897), reprinted in
Holmes, COLLECTED PAPERS, 167, 181 (New York, 1921).
5 Cairns, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEEL, 236-239 (Baltimore, 1949).
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formative, is giving us an idealized version of the judicial process in
those courts.' He was concerned with the law-finding function of
courts for which a body of authoritative guides to decision had still
to be developed. Cairns makes an excellent summary of his theory:
"Bacon took the view that in order to achieve justice in the cases not
clearly provided for by statute or otherwise the judge has three courses
open to him. He may proceed on the analogy of precedents, or by the
use of examples, or by his own sound judgment and discretion."
7
Cardozo was writing of the process of finding the law in an ultimate
court of review where it was necessary to fill gaps in law in the second
sense-as Holmes put it to make law interstitiallyq-and was pointing
out the difficulty of determining how far a court can go, when filling
a gap in the law, "without going beyond the walls of the interstice."9
This, Cardozo considered he must learn for himself. "Logic, and
history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted standard of right
conduct, are the forces which singly or in combination shape the
progress of the law. Which of these shall dominate in any case must
depend largely upon the comparative importance or value of the social
interests that will thereby be promoted or impaired." How to weigh
these elements of decision will "come with years of habitude in the
practice of an art."'0 It will be a matter of intuition born of experience.
With this Cairns contrasts what he terms my "severely analytical""
theory of judicial decision. But Cardozo and I are not treating of the
same thing. He is thinking of finding the applicable precept where,
because of a gap in the body of authoritative precepts, one has to be
made for cases like the one in hand. I was thinking of the steps in the
judicial process as a whole. Cardozo was speaking of the cases where
creative judicial action is called for. Cairns thinks that I err at one
extreme and Cardozo at the other. He is too elusive while I am too
analytical. He prefers Dewey's analysis. 2 As Cairns applies Dewey's
analysis,
"The vital point is that the judge does not first find the facts, then
ascertain and develop the law, and then apply the result to the facts.
6 3 Bacon, WoRKs, 145 (Ed. by Spedding, Ellis & Heath, Boston, 1879).
7 Cairns, LEGAL PMMosoPHY FOM PLATO TO HEGEL, 237 (Baltimore, 1949).
8 Holmes, 3., in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 221, 37 S. Ct. 524,
61 L. Ed. 1086 (1917).
9 Cardozo, Tim NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 113-114 (New Haven, 1921).
10 Id. at 114.
11 Cairns, LEGAL PBUosoPHE ROM PLATO TO HEGEL, 238 (Baltimore, 1949).
12 Dewey, LoGic, 101 ff. 120-122 (New York, 1938).
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He does even not know what the operative facts are until the apparent-
ly relevant facts have been tested in conjunction with the ideas that
forecast the solution. He does not even know what the law is until he
has settled upon the solution which he believes he will accept. At that
point the judge then 'finds the law,' and it may well be that the provi-
sional solution will have to be abandoned if the 'law' as the judge 'finds
it' will not permit the proposed solution. The judge will then seek a
different solution and again 'find the law.' This process will continue
until a solution is found which will withstand the test of the law, the
facts, and any other materials the judge deems relevant."' 3
But is this a statement of the judicial process or is it rather one of
the administrative process? The administrative official has a policy to
enforce. He looks upon his problem in the light of that policy and
endeavors to effectuate the policy so far as the law will let him. No
doubt he will form an idea of the appropriate determination, shape the
facts to it, and seek to find how to work his predetermined solution
into the legal limits of his authority. But cases do not come to a court
in that way. In an appellate court the case comes before the judges
on a record in which the facts have been found in the verdict of a jury
or by the findings of a trial judge in a decree or upon trial without a
jury. Where the case is in a court of first instance, if there is trial to
a jury, the issues of fact are settled in advance by the pleadings and
the trial judge must instruct the jury as to the legal result of finding
each issue one way or the other. He may put special questions to the
jury as to details of fact. If the case is in equity very likely the facts
will be found by a master in chancery and his findings confirmed upon
exceptions before the judge comes to consider and apply the law. But
where the case is tried to the court without a jury in any event the
issues of fact will be defined by the pleadings, or in the most recent
American practice in pretrial proceedings, and the court will be re-
quired to make findings of fact and separate findings of the law applic-
able thereto. Thus even the judge at first instance either has the facts
found for him by jury or master or referee, or finds them specially
himself, and then proceeds to apply the law to them as he finds it.
There was a time in some American states when inadequately staffed
courts of review with crowded dockets badly in arrears left many cases
to be decided by single judges in a hurry and the administrative
method was too often employed. But it was reprobated and has never
been the received method in the common-law world.
13 Cair s, LEGAL PmLosoPm arO PLATo TO HEGEL, 239 (Baltimore, 1949).
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A persistent idea that there is properly no administrative element
in the decision of causes, and that application of law is or should be
a purely mechanical process, goes back to Aristotle's Politics. 4 Aris-
totle conceived that discretion was an administrative attribute;" that
in administration regard was to be had to times and men and special
circumstances, and the magistrates were to use a wise discretion in
adjusting the machinery of government to actual situations as they
arose. On the other hand, he thought that in judging according to law
there was no discretion."6 The judicial office was a Procrustean one
of fitting each case to the legal bed, if necessary, by a surgical opera-
tion. This fitted well into the Byzantine theory of lawmaking and
of judicial application which French publicists adopted in the sixteenth
century and gave currency to in the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries. This idea has broken down in practice no less than the idea of
complete separation of the judicial from the lawmaking process.
It was a favorite political idea of the eighteenth and nineteenth
century that a rule in the narrower sense could be provided for every
case expressly or by prescribing set premises from which further rules
were necessary deductions to be reached by pure and absolute logical
processes. As is the case with almost all widely held theories there was
a sound kernel here. In the fields of the legal order appropriate to
rules in the narrower sense rules and authoritative starting points from
which to reach further rules are both practicable and desirable. But
even here it is often necessary to choose from among starting points
of equal authority and the choice is beyond the reach of mechanical
logic. Moreover, there are fields of the legal order to which rules in the
narrower sense are not or are less appropriate. Here the theory of
mechanical-logical application of exactly prescribed rules or rules
logically drawn from exactly prescribed premises fails. But there were
three special reasons for its currency in America. One reason is to be
found in fear of arbitrary judicial action growing out of English
political history. Desire to preclude possibility of arbitrary judicial
action was especially strong in the United States because in seven-
teenth-century England (the time of colonizing America) the criminal
law, in the hands of appointees of the Crown subject to arbitrary
14 ii, 8, 13; iii, 15, 4-6, iii, 16, 4-7.
15 Ibid. See also, Nicomachaean Ethics, v, 4, 3-4; v, 10, 6-7.
16 PoiLiics, iii, 16, 4-7.
17 As to this it must be remembered that he is thinking of laws, not of law in the
second sense, as more than an aggregate of rules in the strict sense.
[VOL.. I
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN ACTION
removal, had been found an effective agent of political and religious
persecution. Our law as to misdemeanors had developed in the Court
of Star Chamber, an administrative tribunal, and the contests between
the courts and the Crown in the seventeenth century had convinced the
next age that there was no safety other than in hard and fast legal
formulas applied mechanically. Another reason is to be found in the
Puritan doctrine of consociation rather than subordination, that we
are "not over one another but with one another" which I have spoken
of elsewhere."8 Another reason grew out of colonial experience. Colo-
nial justice was long executive or legislative. There had been but little
experience of true judicial justice with the checks upon judicial action
which the common-law tradition and pressure of professional opinion
provide.
After the French Revolution reaction from political absolutism
reinforced ideas of the judicial function inherited from the Roman
law of the later empire and brought about a general acceptance of the
mechanical logical theory for a time everywhere. In other words, poli-
tical history and the Puritanism of our formative era merely tightened
the hold upon us of a theory which for a time was accepted throughout
Europe. To find a proper mean between a system of rules applied
mechanically and a system of completely individualized justice is one
of the inherent difficulties of all administration of justice. In the move-
ment back and forth from the over-arbitrary to the over-mechanical
the nineteenth century tended to stand for the latter. 9
B. THE TECHNICAL AND THE DISCRETIONARY IN THE PROCESS
OF APPLICATION.-I have spoken elsewhere of two antagonistic ideas
18 Pound, Tim SpriaT or =E* ComrmroN LAW, c. 2. (Boston, 1921).
19 This is well brought out in a much quoted passage from a well known text writer.
"General restrictions in these matters, if universally adhered to with literal strictness,
will necessarily involve some apparent absurdities, when applied to the circumstances of
certain particular cases. But to leave it in the breast of the judge to relax or supersede
general restrictions and rules, whenever he shall think particular cases not within the
reason of them, may perhaps, by some, be thought a more important absurdity, and a
matter of greater mischief in its tendency and consequences, than that which is intended
to be obviated by it; for this is in fact making the discretion of the judge the only law
in such cases. An error, which our forefathers seem to have been even illiberally studious
to keep clear of. For their creed seems to have been, what I have read expressed, in so
much energy of terms, by a great judge even of these times. 'The discretion of a judge
is the law of tyrants; it is always unknown; it is different in different men; it is casual
and depends upon constitution, temper and passion. In the best it is oftentimes caprice;
in the worst it is every vice, folly and passion to which human nature is liable.' " Fearne,
EssAy oN Tim LEAmnmn OF CONTINGENT RsAniNDERs AND ExEcuTORY DEvisEs, 428
(Philadelphia, 1791), note A, quoting Pratt, Cj., (afterwards Lord Camden) in Doe v.
Kersey, (C.P., 1765).
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which we find everywhere in the administration of justice, namely, the
technical and the discretionary. 0 In another way of putting it, there is
a contrast between application of law in the second sense, that is,
application by an authoritative technique of a body of authoritative
guides to decision and determination of controversies by regarding
them as unique and applying the sense of justice and the experience
of the tribunal to the particular situation of fact. Typically, it is a
contrast between the judicial and the administrative. But, as has been
said above, the two, while typically distinct, shade into one another.
Standards are part of the body of authoritative guides to decision. Yet
judicial application of them involves the administrative method. Ad-
ministrative agencies have a function of guidance directed by discre-
tion. Yet the exercise of discretion may involve determinations re-
quired to be governed by rules provided by legislation. Thus there
is an administrative element in judicial application of law in the second
sense and a judicial element in administrative application. In the strict
law and in the maturity of law the tendency is to repress and endeavor
to exclude the administrative element in application. In the strict law
this is sought by hard and fast mechanical procedure. In the maturity
of law it is sought by attempt to reduce the whole of law in the second
sense to rules in the narrower sense to be applied logically. An ex-
ample may be seen in the nineteenth-century mode of treating all
questions of exercise of the powers of a court of equity as jurisdictional
making rules of granting or denying relief instead of referring them to
principles by which discretion could be guided.2'
In the strict law the tendency was to some extent corrected and
the balance with the administrative element was in some measure
achieved at first by fictions and later by an executive dispensing power.
The authority of the praetor at Rome derived from a part of the royal
authority to which the magistrates succeeded on the expulsion of the
kings. In the Germanic law when the king administered justice he was
not bound by the formality of the law as the ordinary tribunals were.
This royal dispensing power turns into interposition of praetor or
chancellor on equitable grounds. The origin of English equity is to be
found in a royal power of discretionary application in particular cases,
a phase of the royal dispensing power which was one of the causes of
the downfall of the Stuarts. Carried too far in the stage of equity and
20 See Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 Col. L. Rev. 676 (1913).
21 See note 1 supra.
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natural law, this over-development of the administrative element in
application brings about a reaction and in the maturity of law the ad-
ministrative element is again pushed to the wall.22 Today in the United
States we have been attempting to restore the balance by reverting to
justice without law (i.e. law in the second sense) through wide and un-
checked or little checked powers of adjudication by administrative
agencies. In Continental Europe there has been some movement in this
direction. In penal legislation, the general tendency is to seek to work
out some system of judicial individualization-judicial fitting of the
rule and the application to the case, along the lines which had already
developed in the systematized English equity.
In the nineteenth century men believed in administration of justice
mechanically by abstract formulas. A reaction from this has been
going on throughout, the world and no doubt marks a new period of
growth or a new stage of legal development. In criminalistics it takes
the form of a movement for the individualization of penal treatment. -3
In France it appeared at the end of the nineteenth centtry as a move-
ment for a newer and freer method of interpreting the codes.24 But the
"interpretation" referred to is partly law-finding by developing code
provisions by analogy and partly the application side of the judicial
function. In Germany, it took the form of agitation for "equitable
interpretation" which will be considered below. Here again "interpre-
tation" means partly law-finding as above and partly application. In
England, it is manifest in Lord Esher's farewell speech in which he
thanked God that English law was not a science,25 in Sir John Hollam's
protest against treating the private controversy between John Doe and
Richard Roe not as a cause in which justice is to be done primarily but
primarily as a means by which to settle the law for other litigants, 26
and in the wider discretion which is now accorded to the bench in order
to give fuller power of attaining just results in individual cases. In the
22 See, e.g., Selden, TABLE TAIx, tit. Equity, (S.S. ed. 1927); St. Germain, DocToR
AND STUDENT, Dial. 1, cc. 16-17 (published London, 1523, convenient ed. by Muchall,
1815, reprinted in the United States 1874 and 1886); 1 Spence, HISTORY OF THE EQUI-
TABLE JuRiSDICTON or THE COURT OF CHANCERY, Part 2, Book 2, c. 1 (Philadelphia,
1846).
23 See, e.g., Saleilles, L'nrDIvmUA.iSATiox DE LA PEInE (Paris, 1902) transl. by Mrs.
Jastrow as THE INDIvImUALIzATIoN OF PUNISHUENT (Boston, 1911).
24 The classical book is, G~ny, MiTHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT
PRIVg PosniT (Paris, 1899, 2d ed., Paris, 1919).
25 Manson, BUILDERS OF OUR LAW DURING THE REIGN OF QUEEN VICTORIA, 398 (2d
ed., London, 1904).
26 Hollams, JoTT3Nrs OF AN OLD SorzCiToR, 161 (London, 1905).
19551
NEW YORK LAW FORUM
United States it has been manifest in a tendency to seek extra-legal
attainment of just results while preserving the form of the law. The
Germans have worked out a theory of this in their controversy over so-
called equitable application of legal precepts.
C. LAW IN BooKs AND THE JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESSES IN AcTIoN. 7-- That the judicial and administrative proc-
esses in action do not always conform to law in the second sense as
laid down in the law books in the results reached, and sometimes do
not even attempt to conform or create an appearance of conformity,
has been much insisted upon in the present century. Such departures
from the ideal of a uniform administration of justice according to law
are more noticeable at some times than at others. Also they are more
marked in some fields of the law than in others. The reason for them
may be found sometimes in lack of social psychoiogical guarantee be-
hind particular legal precepts."8 This chiefly affects application of legal
precepts so that they fail to bring about the results for which they were
devised. Another reason is to be found in the pressure of newly as-
serted interests which, if recognized, may require new delimitation of
those which had been recognized and delimited in the past. Here the
effect is chiefly upon the law-finding process. Still another is changing
ideals of the end of law. This affects choice of starting points for
reasoning, and interpretation, but also the application of standards. It
is more marked in application of standards because of the margin for
circumstances of time, place, and individual case which is involved.
Hence it is misleading to take application of standards as the type of
27 Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Amer. L. Rev. 12 (1910), reprinted
from 14 REP. MARYLAND STATE BAR Ass'N; 298 (1909); Wiel, Public Policy in Western
Water Decisions, 1 Calif. L. Rev. 11 (1912); 2 Hervey, SOME RECORDS OF CRZn, 6-7,
note 1 (London, 1892); Pound, Inherent and Acquired Difficulties in the Administration
of Punitive Justice, Puoc. Air. PoL. Sci. Ass'N, 223, 234-238 (Baltimore, 1907);
Stammler, SYsTMATIscH THEoo DER RECHTSWISiENSCHAFr, 130-134 (2d ed. Halle,
1923); Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 1248-1250
(1931); Clark, Reform in Bankruptcy Administration, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1192-1201
(1930); Green, JunO AND JURY, c. 14 (Kansas City, Mo., 1930); Frank, LAW AND THE
MODERN MND, c. 16 (New York, 1930).
28 Spinoza, TRAcTATUs PoLIcus, c. 10, § 5 (Elwes' transl. p. 381, London, 1900);
Duff, SPINOZA'S POLiTiCAL AND ET3EiCAL PROSOPHy, c. 22 (Glasgow, 1903); 1 Bentham,
WORKS, 146 (Edinburgh, 1843); Markby, ELEmENTS OF LAW, §§ 48-59 (Oxford, 1889);
Salmond, JuRISPRUD NCE, § 30 (London, 1910); Jellinek, ALLoEMEINE STAATSLr.RE, 89
ff., 324 ff. (2d ed., Berlin, 1900); 332 (3d ed., Berlin, 1914); Pound, The Limits of
Effective Legal Action, 22 Rep. Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n 221 (1916), 3 A.B.A.J. 55 (1917);
27 Internat. J. of Ethics 150 (1917); Cohen, Positivism and the Limits of Idealism in
the Law, 27 Col. L. Rev. 237 (1927).
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application of law in the second sense. Much of neo-realist jurispru-
dence builds on this taking of standards as the type of legal precept-
something quite as mistaken as the nineteenth-century taking of the
rule in the narrower sense (e.g. a rule of property) as the type.
There is nothing new in this departure of the judicial process in
action from the law in the books. It has always happened in particular
cases sporadically, and from time to time in legal history has happened
on a somewhat larger scale for classes of cases. But as we look back
we see that it has not, so far as legal systems which have reached
maturity are concerned, permanently impaired the stability of the legal
order or the certainty and uniformity in the judicial process which is
attained through law in the second sense.
Take, for example, what have been called "Mansfield's innova-
tions." They were a phenomenon in the era of growth under the influ-
ence of the ideas of natural law. Serjeant Hill, "a very deep black-
letter lawyer,"2 9 is said to have threatened to burn his law books, say-
ing that law books were of no use in the King's Bench under Mansfield.
But Lord Mansfield's decisions have been adhered to and with scarce
an exception have stood as law for almost two hundred years. They
did not destroy law. They made law. Moreover, "Mansfield's innova-
tions" were typically in finding law, not in applying law, unless in the
case of the indenture in which the counterpart was cut straight across
instead of the waving or indented line called for in the old books.3"
Even here the established conveyance was merely adapted to modern
conditions without changing its nature or effect or making any essen-
tial modification of its nature.
Jhering pointed out the administrative element in adjudication,
thinking, however, of law-finding." Stammler emphasized the adminis-
trative element in application of law, in attaining just results through
legal precepts. 2 It is true that we cannot separate law-finding and ap-
plication of law in the sense that the results of application, measured
by received ideals, will determine the starting point for law-finding as
between starting points of equal authority. But this affects law-finding
rather than application of law.
29 2 Lord Campbell, LIEs O F TE C=. JusacEs, 571-572 (London, 1849).
30 id. at 571.
31 Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 Harv. L. Rev.
140 (1911).
32 But his subsuming of questions of law under the social ideal and its principles
has to do both with finding of law and with application. It is specially fitted to applica-
tion.
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Departures of the administrative process in action from the law
in the books which should govern it have been considered in another
connection.33 They occur chiefly in law-finding and in interpreting
legal precepts. Application of standards by administrative agencies
involves a wide margin for adaptation to circumstances, and is less
affected by the lack of checks upon administrative determination and
excessive zeal to promote particular ends which often lead to adminis-
trative disregard of legal precepts.
D. THE MODES OF APPLYING LEGAL PIECEPTS. 4-- A period of
enacted law brought on a controversy among German jurists at the
beginning of the present century which is instructive for us. Three
schools could be distinguished in Germany after the code, differen-
tiated according to the manner in which they applied code provisions,
and the point of view from which they approached the code. First,
there was what we may call the literal school.3" The adherents of this
school asked: What do the several code provisions mean as they stand,
applying the canons of genuine interpretation? They endeavored to
find the proper code pigeonhole for each concrete cause, to put the
cause in hand into it by a logical process, and to formulate the result
in a judgment. Their standpoint was essentially analytical.
Secondly, there was a historical school. With the adherents of this
school the code provisions were assumed to be in the main declaratory
of the law as it previously existed. The code was regarded as a con-
tinuation and development of pre-existing law. With them all exposi-
tion of the code and of any of its provisions must begin by an elaborate
inquiry into the pre-existing law and the history and development of
the competing juristic theories among which the framers of the code
had to choose. This, however, has to do with law-finding and interpre-
tation. Their method of application of the law was substantially the
same as that of the literal school. While they saw in a code provision
not the command of the sovereign, to be regarded in and of itself in
applying it, but a development out of the juristic theory of the past,
they agreed that when its content was ascertained and was interpreted
the process of application was a purely logical one-do the facts come
within or fail to come within the rule? Such, according to this school
33 Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Amer. L. Rev. 12 (1910).
34 Cardozo, THE NATuRE OF THE JUDIcIAL PROCESS (New Haven, 1921).
85 E.g. Planck, B0RGERICHES GESETZBUCH (1st ed., 2 vols., 1897-1900, 7 vols., 1913-
1933).
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also was the sole question for a court. Ethical questions were for the
legislator. When the court had by historical investigation found out
what the rule was, it had simply to fit the rule to just and unjust
alike.36 In other words, both the literal and the historical school took
the end-of-the-eighteenth-century position and wholly excluded the ad-
ministrative element in application. Needless to say this to some extent
broke down in practice. But the breakdown was more or less covered
up by a fiction of interpretation.
A third school, which I have ventured to call the equitable school,
sprung up and grew strong in Germany in the first decade of the
present century.3 7 To this school the essential thing was a reasonable
and just solution of the individual controversy. It conceived of the
legislative rule as a general guide to the judge, leading him toward the
just result. But it insisted that within wide limits he should be free to
deal with the individual case so as to meet the demands of justice
between the parties and accord with the reason and moral sense of
ordinary men. It insisted that application of law was not a purely
mechanical process. It contended that the process involved not merely
logic but intuition; that the cause was not to be fitted to the rule, but
the rule to the cause. In other words, it recognized the administrative
element as a legitimate part of the judicial function and insisted that
individualization in the application of legal precepts Was no less impor-
tant than the precepts themselves. This is really a theory of the ap-
plication of standards extended to all application as the others are
theories of the application of rules in the narrower sense extended to
all application.
II. INDIVIDUALIZATION OF APPLICATION
INDIVIDUALIZATION in application is a problem in all systems of
law which have reached maturity. In all such systems jurists are con-
fronted by a need of balance between the general security and security
of the economic order, on the one hand, calling for certainty, uni-
formity, and predictability, and the individual life, on the other hand,
6 See the protest against this method in Cosack, LEHRBUCH: DES DFUTSCHFN
BUGERcHEN REcnTs, 41 (1st ed., Jena, 1899), and Leonhard's comment, DER
ALLGEIEa THErL DES BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHS, 43-50 (Berlin, 1900).
37 See discussions in 1 Endemann, LEEBUCH DES Bi"RGERLICHE RECHTS, §§ 12, 13
(9th ed., Berlin, 1903); 1 Kohler, LEHRBUCH DES B0RGERLICHEN RECHS, §§ 38-40 (Berlin,
1906); Heck, GESETZEsAUSLEG - , uND INTERESSExJEumSPRUDENZ, § 19 (Tilbingen, 1914-
a critique of Kohler). See also, 1 Planiol, TI.iTf fEiMENTAME DS DROIT CIVM, nos. 199-
225 (12th ed., Paris, 1932).
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calling for individualized application. Let us look at that problem as
it appears in Anglo-American law of today and as we find it in the civil
or modern Roman law and under the modern codes.
A. INDIVIDUALIZATION OF APPLICATION IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAw.-The need of individualization was felt in the common law in
the stage of the strict law when resort was had to the dispensing powers
of the king, which came to be exercised by the chancellor and led in
time to the rise of the Court of Chancery and development of equity.
Today we may recognize six modes of individualizing application of
law in our system: (1) Individualization in equity; (2) individualiza-
tion by the jury; (3) individualizing by the court through latitude of
application under guise of choice or ascertainment of a rule; (4) indi-
vidualization through legal standards; (5) individualization through a
series of mitigating devices in criminal procedure; (6) individualiza-
tion through wide discretion of magistrates in petty causes. Some of
these have been systematized, while some others remain crude.
1. In Equity.-In the common law we have achieved a system of
individualization in equity through discretion in the exercise of juris-
diction and adaptation of remedies. Anglo-American equity steers a
middle course between two extremes. The eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries sought to individualize the law by minute rules in the nar-
rower sense, so as to have a rule for every possible case. At the other
extreme is the idea for which Ofner3" and Fuchs39 contend, namely,
that a rule of law is a mere general guide by the help of which, to the
extent it helps him, the court does what it takes to be justice in the
case in hand. As Dr. Kirchwey once put it, referring to realist views
as to the force of precedents in our Anglo-American technique of
decision, a rule was to be "only a flickering light" to guide the tri-
bunal.4" Each extreme over-simplifies a difficult problem.
Especially in those fields which call for rules in the narrower sense
rather than standards, "justice in the case in hand," or "the sense of
right and justice of the ordinary man," or "the social standard of
justice" are likely to be too subjective, in a time when there are not
universally recognized authorities in these matters, to be compatible
38 STUDIEN SOCIALER JURISPRUDENZ, 1-29 (Leipzig, 1894).
39 RECHT vzw WAHMr IN HEUTIGEN JUSTIZ (Berlin, 1908); DiE GEmEzN-
SCHADLICHKEIT DER XONSTRUKTIVEN JURISPRUDENZ (Karlsruhe, 1909); juuSTICHER KUL-
TuSxA-SF (Karlsruhe, 1912).
40 Remarks before the Conference on Legal and Social Philosophy (1913).
Dr. Kirchwey's address was not printed. I write from notes taken at the time.
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with the general security. It impairs the balance between the general
security and the individual life. When a rule of property or a rule of
commercial law or the liberty of the individual is involved, a rule of
law must be more than a "flickering light" to guide toward the result.
On the one hand, we must recognize an administrative element in the
judicial function. To this extent the German reformers were on solid
ground. On the other hand, we must recognize the place of rule and
conception as giving us certainty and uniformity and thus giving effect
to the social interest in the general security. To this extent the nine-
teenth century was on solid ground. Instead of the nineteenth-century
solution-to individualize the law (second sense) by excessive detail-
or the solution of the German radicals-to individualize the application
of law by taking away from rules all character but that of general
guides-equity in the common-law system found the solution in indi-
vidualizing the remedy in accordance with principles and in adopting
a theory of finding the law that will give rational form and intelligent
direction to what is actually done. In Anglo-American equity we
choose such a remedy and apply the remedy chosen in such a way as
best to give effect to the rule as a precept of justice in the case in hand.
For example, in a bill in the nature of a bill of peace we may
enjoin all the parties and try the case as to all in equity, or we may
enjoin all but one and allow that one to proceed at law, holding the
others to the result, or, where the relief sought is against the public or
a large and indefinite portion of the public, bring in a sufficient number
to be fairly representative. There is the same substantive rule which-
ever course is taken. But the remedy to give effect to it is chosen in
view of and is adapted to the case in hand.4 Or take the situation in
which a court of equity enjoins breach of a contract of employment and
assures counter-performance by a conditional decree adapted to the
case,42 or interpleader against a resident and a non-resident claimant,
where the court may make the resident claimant indemnify the com-
plainant on proving his claim, if the non-resident claimant will not
come in on notice.43 Again in cases of fraud relief may be granted by
41 Lockwood v. Lawrence, 77 Me. 297, 306, 52 Am. Rep. 763 (1885); Smith v.
Smith, 148 Mass. 1, 6, 18 N. E. 595 (1888); Foxwell v. Webster, 2 Drew. & Sm. 250
(Vice Chancellors 1863), 62 Eng. Rep. 617; Sheffield Water Works v. Yeomans, [1866]
L.R. 2 Ch. App. 8.
42 E.g., Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 221, 51 A. 973, 58 L. R. A.
227 (1902).
43 Stevenson v. Anderson, 2 Vesey & Beames 407 (Chancery, 1814), 35 Eng. Rep.
373.
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way of cancellation or of constructive trust or of equitable lien accord-
ing to what will best achieve justice in the particular case. 4 In cases
of pursuit of a trust fund where mingling has taken place, the court
may impose a constructive trust pro tanto or an equitable lien accord-
ing to what will best effectuate the substantive law and reach an equit-
able result in the case in hand.4" Likewise, where there has been unjust
enrichment at another's expense remedy may be found in subrogation,
equitable lien or constructive trust, as the circumstances of the case
may make expedient.46 Also where there is a contract right, the remedy
may be reformation, specific performance, or constructive trust in
order to give effect to the right to get a parcel of land in specie where
there has been an error in the conveyance.
What is significant, equity does not permit any discretion as to the
substantive rights. But it regards the end of the rule and seeks the
most effective means of attaining it while reaching a just result in
view of the case in hand.
We cannot allow discretion as to recognizing, delimiting, or secur-
ing of interests. But how best to secure them, in view of conflicting or
overlapping interests, under the circumstances of the case in hand, is
a question of administration. It is a question of considering the parties
and the circumstances and giving effect to the ends of the precepts of
substantive law in view thereof. Equitablizing of our application of
law is one of the problems of the future.
2. Through the Jury.4T-The chief reliance of the common law
for individualizing the application of law has been the power of juries
to render general verdicts; the power to find the facts in such a way
as to compel a different result from that which the legal rule strictly
applied would require. Probably this power alone made the common
law of master and servant tolerable in American jurisdictions fifty
years ago. Yet exercise of it, with respect to which, as Coke expressed
it, the jurors are chancellors, 48 has made the jury a most unsatisfactory
44 Scott, TRuss, § 508 (Boston, 1939); In re Hallett's Estate, [18791 13 Ch. D.
696, 709. For a case where the court refused to impose a constructive trust and instead
imposed an equitable lien, see Hart v. Dogge, 27 Neb. 256, 42 N.W. 1035 (1889).
45 Scott, Trusts, supra note 44; In re Hallett's Estate, supra note 44.
46 See e.g., Kinkead v. Ryan, 64 N. J. Eq. 454, 461-462, 53 A. 1053, modified 65
N. J. Eq. 726, 55 A. -730 (1903).
47 Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1171, 1188-1192
(1931); Green, JUDGE AND JURY, c. 5, esp. pp. 177 ff. (Kansas City, Mo., 1930); Wash-
ington, Damages in Contract at Common Law, 48 L. Q. Rev. 90, 107-108 (1932).
48 Hixt v. Goats, 1 Rolle 257 (1615).
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tribunal in many classes of cases and, in view of the practice of re-
peated new trials, which this power has in large part occasioned, a most
expensive one. It is a crude mode of individualization.
3. Through Latitude of Application under the Guise of Choice
or Ascertainment of a Rule. 9-- In some types of cases to an apparently
growing extent the practice of our application of law has been coming
to be that courts take the rules of law as a general guide, determine
what they conceive the equities of the case demand, and contrive to
render a judgment accordingly, wrenching the law no more than neces-
sary. Many courts today are suspected of ascertaining what the sup-
posed equities of a controversy require and then citing adjudicated
cases to justify the result desired. Occasionally we find a judge avow-
ing frankly that he looks chiefly at the ethical situation inter partes
and does not allow the law to interfere therewith beyond what is inevit-
able." This is essentially what the German equitable school contended
for. It is something of which complaint may be heard in America
whenever a knot of lawyers is met with discussing recent decisions of
the courts.
As to the jury, there has been a steady growth of means of
minimizing their power of dispensing with the law. Giving up of the
"scintilla" doctrine, direction of verdicts, and putting special questions
to the jury instead of leaving the whole case to a general verdict, have
tempered jury lawlessness. As to the courts there is, especially in
applying standards, at times a crude equitable application-a crude
individualization. This power is assumed by courts in America more
widely at times than appears on the surface, or, at least, more widely
than we like to acknowledge. But there is this characteristic difference.
In Germany a generation ago it was admitted. A scientific theory was
worked out to explain and justify it, and an open controversy raged
as to its propriety. That is, the German jurists sought to have indi-
vidualizing done intelligently and systematically. With us the process
is largely concealed. Ostensibly there is no such power of equitable
application. The process reveals itself under the name of "implica-
tion," or in the guise of two lines of decisions of the same tribunal
49 Hutcheson, Lawyer's Law and the Little Small Dice, 7 Tulane L. Rev. 1 (1932);
id., Judging as Administration, 7 Amer. L.S. Rev. 1069 (1932); id., The Judgment
Intuitive-The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decisions, 14 Cornell L.Q. 274
(1919).
50 Carter, The Supreme Court and its Method of Work, 1 Ill. L. Rev. 151. 155
(1906).
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upon the same point from which it may choose at will, 51 or in the
form of what might be called soft spots in the law-spots where the
lines are so drawn by the adjudicated cases that the court may go
either way, as the exigencies of equitable application may require, with
no apparent transgression of what purport to be settled rules. Some-
times this sort of application gets over into questions of property where
individualized application is out of place as, for example, in assuming
permissive user or adverse user where there is a claim of acquisition of
an easement by prescription. Thus we have not a little of equitable
application in America, while disclaiming it in theory, and that, too,
in a way which is unhappily destructive of certainty and uniformity
in fields of the administration of justice where those qualities are re-
quired. Not only do lawyers and law writers perceive this situation,
but is it perceived also, in an age of publicity, by the public? Neces-
sary as it is, to some extent and in some fields of the administration of
justice, especially in a time in which received ideals are being rejected
and ideas of the end of law are in transition, the method in which it
is often carried out in this country is rightly felt to be unlegal. It
injures respect for law and for the courts. There is no one cause of the
current attitude toward law. But judicial evasion and warping of the
law, in the endeavor to secure in practice a freedom of judicial action
not conceded in theory, is certainly one cause.
4. Through Legal Standards.5 -In the common-law system in
private law individualized application is achieved both at law5 3 and
in equity" by precepts establishing standards. 5 The standards are to
be applied with reference to the circumstances of each case.5 But ap-
plication of them is by no means wholly at large.5 7 Also today applica-
tion of standards is largely committed to administrative agencies 8
51 A striking instance is discussed in Faulkner v. Simms, 68 Neb. 295, 300-306, 89
N.W. 171 (1903).
52 As to standards in other systems see German Civil Code, §§ 242, 826;
Swoboda, Das Privatrecht der Zukunft, 25 Archiv fUr Rechts - und Wirtschaftsphilosophie
459, 466-468 (1932).
53 Note, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 838-842 (1933); Note, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 494-502 (1934);
Interstate Commerce Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1952).
5 Romilly, M. R., in: Haywood v. Cope, 25 Beav. 140, 150-153, 53 Eng. Rep.
589, 593-595 (Rolls Ct., 1838) ; English Common Law Procedure Act § 81 (1854).
55 See Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 645-646
(1923).
56 Ibid.
57 See the excellent statement by Langton, J., in: Greenwood v. Greenwood [1937]
P. 157, 164, [1937] 3 All E. R. 63, 64.
58 See as to standards in administrative law, Landis, Tn1 AominsIRAnV- PR0CESS,
66-68 (New Haven, 1938).
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5. In Criminal Law." 9 -Our criminal law has a long series of
mitigating devices for introducing discretion into its application. The
police exercise a certain discretion as to who shall be brought before
the courts. The public prosecutor has wide and substantially uncon-
trolled power of ignoring offenses or offenders, of dismissing proceed-
ings in their earlier stages, of so presenting them to grand juries that
no indictment follows, of declining to prosecute after indictment, and
of agreeing to accept a plea of guilty of a lesser offense. 60 The grand
jury may ignore a charge and refuse to find an indictment. The trial
jury notoriously exercises a dispensing power through its general
verdict of not guilty, which is not reviewable. 61 Exercised in homicide
cases during the vogue of the "unwritten law" it led to the situation
Mark Twain satirized when he called upon the legislature to make
insanity a crime. The court has at common law a wide discretion as
to sentence,62 and often as to suspension or mitigation of sentence; to
which in recent years we have added probation.63
Dissatisfaction with exercise of discretion in judicial sentence and
inability to procure convictions in cases of homicide because of fixed
sentences which juries regarded as over severe has led many jurisdic-
tions by statute to leave assessment of punishment to the trial jury.64
In the penal code of California there is provision for the fixing of
penalties by the jury, and a collection of criminal cases by a captain
59 Pound, CRnnNAL JuSTICE IN Am CA, 41-43 (New York, 1930).
60 Bettman, Cimm-rnL JusTIcE SURVEYs ANALYsis, 39, 95-100, in: National Com-
mission on Law Observance and Enforcement, REPORT oN PRosECUTIoN (Washington,
1931); National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, REPORT Or THE
ComoxissioN, 3, 95-100 (Washington, 1931); IuNqois CmRs SumvEy, 42-45, 269-274,
301-307 (Chicago, 1929); American Law Institute, Model Code of Criminal Procedure,
§ 305 and Commentary (Philadelphia, 1930).
61 As to this, see Train, FROMr TnE DIsmicr ATTOREY's OFFICE, c. 6 (New York,
1939).
62 2 Harris (Ed.), REMnsCENCES OF SIR HENR HAwKINs, 282-290 (London,
1904); Train, FROMr THE Dismxicr ATTORNEY's OFFCE, 167-177 (New York, 1939). On
sentence generally, see Exner, STUDIEN UEBER DIE STRAFZUMMSUNGSPRAXIs DER DEUTSCHEN
GEICHITE, KRnnrNAisTrscnE ABHANDLUNGEN, No. 16 (Leipzig, 1931); Heinitz, Da
STRFzwECx BRi DER RiCnTERLICHEN STR sF.MSSUNG, 22 Archiv fuir Rechts - und
WVirtschaftsphilosophie 259 (Berlin-Gruenwald, 1929) ; 3 Mendizfbal y Martin, TRATADO
DE D RECHo NATuRAL 448-461 (7th ed., Madrid, 1928-1931).
63 Glueck, (Ed.) PROBATION AND CRiM:INAL JusTIcE (New York, 1933); National
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, REPORT ON PENAL INSTITuTIONS,
PROBATION AND PAROLE, 184-207 (Washington, 1931); Cooley, PROBATION AND DETIN-
QUENCY, c. 2 (New York, 1927); Young, SOCiAL TREATM ENT IN PROBATION AND DrIM-
quENCY, 139-250 (New York and London, 1937).
04 See Pound, INTRODUCTION TO SALEILLES, THE INDIVIDUAL ZATION Or PUNIsHMENT
(transl. by Jastrow) xvi f. (Boston, 1911).
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of police of San Francisco" enables us to see how the power has been
exercised. As one studies the cases he can see to a certain degree that
broad lines were drawn by the juries, even if crudely. But one of these
lines which is most apparent is between picturesque murder, however
brutal, and brutal murder without the picturesque element. Then too,
the cases show that the choice of penalty depends largely on the
temper of particular juries. For example, Goldenson, a boy of nineteen
who suddenly killed a girl of thirteen was hanged, while Hoff, a mature
man, who brutally murdered a woman who had employed him, having
been sentenced to be hanged on the first trial, on a second trial, granted
for an error of procedure, was sentenced to imprisonment for life. In
the case of murder for gain or incident to robbery this is even more
apparent. The so-called "gas-pipe murderers," who were robbers, were
hanged. So was Kovalev, an escaped Siberian convict, who murdered
for gain. But Sontag and Evans, professional bandits, who had com-
mitted a long series of train robberies, had killed many and shot many
more, were imprisoned for life. So also in the case of Dorsey, a stage
robber and murderer. In these cases the picturesque element seems to
have been decisive, since these were very dangerous criminals. Ex-
perience elsewhere, as I have gathered from the Texas Criminal Re-
ports and the Oklahoma Criminal Reports, has been the same. Ob-
viously, the crude individualization achieved by leaving the assessment
of penalties to trial juries involves quite as much inequality and in-
justice as mechanical application of the law by a magistrate. Upon the
whole, unchecked jury discretion is worse than the little checked
judicial discretion or the judicial discretion checked by assigning
penalties to fixed degrees of crimes which it has superseded.
In England, the discretion of the trial judge as to sentence has
been checked by discretion in review of the sentence by the Court of
Criminal Appeal.66 In America, in recent years we have turned to
nominal sentence and leaving the discretion or form of penal treatment
to an administrative board and have added to the mitigating devises a
system of parole.67 Also at the top of the series is the executive's pre-
rogative of commutation and pardon.
66 Duke, CELEBRATED CRIMINI, CASES OF AmERICA (San Francisco, 1910).
66 English Criminal Appeal Act (1907) § 4(3); Orfield, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN
AMERICA, C. 5 (Boston, 1939).
67 Bruce, Burgess and Harno, THE PROBATION AND PAROLE SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS
CnmSE SuRvay, 427-574 (Chicago, 1929); National Commission on Law Observance
and Enforcement, REPORT ON PENAL INSTITUTIONS, PROBATION AND PAROLE, 127-145
[VOL. I
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN ACTION
Administration of parole laws, unhappily much affected by poli-
tics, has led repeatedly to riots or mutinies in prisons because of arbi-
trary exercise of the powers of the boards. Some of the mitigating
devices have at times been hedged about with procedural limitations.
But such limitations, if they are effective to restrain what might
otherwise be an intolerable margin for the personal equation of the
official, are very likely to give to these devices a purely mechanical
operation and thus afford opportunity for perversion of the legal provi-
sion for special cases into a means of enabling the typical offender to
escape. As one looks back over the series of mitigating devices and
notes how in their history at times they have been few and mechani-
cal" and again at other times have been many and liberally adminis-
tered, he must be struck by the necessity and yet the great difficulty
of maintaining a balance between the discretion required by the social
interest in the individual life, on the one hand, and the general security,
on the other hand. 9
6. In Petty Courts.7°-It has always been recognized that a
wider discretion and freer scope for judicial action are requisite in the
administration of justice in small causes. Hence for a long time lay
justices of the peace were taken to be the ideal tribunal. But the
justices' courts of our formative era have proved to be wholly unsuited
to the cities of today and have largely ceased to be satisfactory tribu-
nals anywhere. It takes a judge who knows the law to know how and
when to dispense with particular precepts. Small causes may well
present quite as difficult problems as those involving large sums of
money or valuable property. Small causes require strong and well
trained judges, and it is here that the administration of justice touches
immediately the greatest number of people. Hence the tendency today
is to set up well organized municipal courts or courts with competent
judges for wider areas to determine such cases.71 Until recently we
(Washington, 1931); Wilcox, PAROLE OF ADULTS FROm STATE PFAi. INSTITUTIONS N
PFwNsYLVANIA (Philadelphia, 1927); Pigeon, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE (New York, 1942).
68 E.g. benefit of clergy, and transportation in the eighteenth century. 1 Stephen,
ISTORY OF THE CP.mAr LAW OF ENGLAND, 468-474 (London, 1883).
09 See Pound, The Rise of Socalized Criminal Justice, in SocIA DEFENsES AGAiNST
CRmIE, Year Book of the National Probation Association, 1-22 (New York, 1942).
70 Smith, JusTcE AND THE POOR, 56-59 (New York, 1919); Schramm, PxmPOuDRE
CoURTs, A STUDY OF THE SXALL CLAIm LITIGANT IN THE PITTSBURGH DIsTRICT (New
York, 1928).
71 The best model is to be found in the English County Courts. See Crawford,
REFLECTIONS AND RECOLLECTIONS, cc. 4-10 and 14 (London, 1936).
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have been callous to the just claims of the small litigants and there is
still much to be done for them.
7 2
B. INDIVIDUALIZATION OF APPLICATION IN THE CIVIL LAW.-
1. Equity (aequitas, iquite, Billigkeit) .73 -The Roman texts fre-
quently speak of aequitas. But it is not in the least a technical term
and has a number of meanings of which "fairness" is the one which is
significant in the present connection. 4 It was applied by the classical
jurists to the bonae fidei iWdicia and other cases in which the iudex was
given a large margin of decision. In this sense it was often referred
to the ius naturale.75 In the modern Roman law it was used for the
margin of discretion in law finding,76 interpretation, and application.
But the nineteenth century was opposed in spirit to discretion in law
finding or in application. "When the enacted law is silent, but now
only in that case, the magistrate ought to make up the deficiency."
7
It is unfortunate, the author adds, that public opinion attributes the
quality of a good judge to "a magistrate who puts himself above the
law and applies it according to his own views."7 In that sense equity
is justice administered not according to the text of the law but accord-
ing to a sentiment of natural right. It has been called "cerebrine
equity" after a text of Papinian, because it is arbitrary.70 The French
Civil Code in a number of cases leaves decision to the discretion of the
judge, and those cases are said to be referred to 6quit s0 The modern
72 See Smith, JusncE AND TmE POOR, cc. 1-6 (New York, 1919); Pound, Tim AD-
MSSTRATiON OF JusTIcE IN Im MODERx CITY, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 302 (1913); Pound,
ORGANIZATION OF ComRTs, 260-270 (Boston, 1940).
73 Rumelin, DiE BIL=Err im RECrHT (Tilbingen, 1921); 1 Ahrens, CoUs DE DROIT
NATUpEL (8th ed., Berlin, 1892); Lasson, SYsTF= DER RECHTSP1rILOSoPmHn, 238-239
(Berlin & Leipzig, 1882); Stammler, LEERE VON D= RICETIGEN RECETE, 242-249 (2d cd.,
Berlin, 1926)-Husik's transl. from 1st ed. 1902, as THEoRY oF J sTIcE, 288-299 (New
York, 1925); Fabreguettes, LA IOGIQUE JUDICIAIRE ET L'ART DE J-UGER, 397-402 (2d ed.,
Paris, 1926).
74 See a good discussion in Clark, PRACTICAL JURISPRUDENCE, 365-374 (Cambridge,
1883); id., HISTORY OF RomAm PaRvATE LAW: I JURISPRUDENCE, 106-113 (Cambridge,
1914).
75 Paul, in Dig. i, 1, 11.
76 Domat, Lois cILVLEs DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL, liv. i, § 2, No. 4 (Paris, 1694)-
transl. by Straban, 1 TrE CiviL LAW IN TE NATURAL ORDER, 87-91 (Cushing's ed.,
Boston, 1850).
77 Fabreguettes, LA LOGIQUE JUDICIAIRE ET L'ART DE JUGER, 397 (2d ed., Paris,
1926).
78 Id. at 398.
79 Id. at 399.
80 E.g. regulation of the use of water, art. 645; respite accorded to a debtor, arts.
1244, 1655, 1900; guardianship of children in case of separation or divorce, art. 320; the
name of the wife in case of separation, art. 311; abatement of debts from play or wagers,
art. 1967; adjustment among associates, art. 1854.
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doctrine is the same as in the common law. There is room for discre-
tion in application only in cases where the law provides for it. The
German Civil Code makes certain provisions depend on what is prac-
ticable."1 Also a measure of personal judgment is required in fixing the
recovery in case of infringement of interests which cannot be valued
in money.82 But in cases where the Roman law left the matter to the de-
termination of a good man (uiri boni arbitrio) the German Civil Code
sometimes lays down a rigid rule-for example, where one of a number
of partners in equal shares did more toward the partnership enterprise
than the others, and also through accident lost more.83 The general
result under the modern codes is substantially that to which the com-
mon-law system has come. Discretion is only to be exercised where the
law itself provides for it, and its exercise, where in the nature of things
that is possible, is to be guided by principles.8 4
C. INDIVIDUALIZATION OF APPLICATION THROUGH ADMINISTRA-
TiVE TRIBuNALs.-Administrative as contrasted with judicial applica-
tion of law is characteristically a matter of discretion. Cases are as-
sumed to be unique and are sought to be decided solely on the particu-
lar circumstances of the particular case. This theory of application,
which is appropriate to the application of standards, tends to be carried
out in the whole field of administrative activity. In the absence of
the checks which make tolerable the relatively small margin now al-
lowed for judicial discretion, the wide scope for personal judgment of
administrative officials which has come to be allowed in recent years
raises serious as well as difficult problems.
81 Sections 1673, 1690, 1820, 1827, 1996, 2227, 2360, 2368.
82 Such cases are put in §§ 343, 847, 971, 1300.
83 Compare Dig. xvii, 2, 6 with German Civil Code, § 722.
84 See Stammler's elaborate attempt to work out principles of application, LE=EE
VON Dh RICHTIGEN REcHTEr, 118-122 (2d ed., Berlin, 1926).
85 Freund, AnonmxiAsITi PowREs OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY, C. 6 (Chicago,
1928); Sigler, THE PROBLEM OF APPARENTLY UNGUIDED ADMI1ISTRATIVE DISCRETION, 19
St. Louis L. Rev. 261 (1934); Pound, Administrative Law, 63-84 (Pittsburgh, 1942);
Landis, THE A n i-,STRATrzE PROCESS, 98-101 (New Haven, 1938); Carr, CONCERNING
ENGrISH ADmmsTRA~rn LAW, 115-126 (New York, 1941); Laun, DAS PREXE ERMESSEN
umi SENE GRENzEN (Leipzig and Vienna, 1910), containing full bibliography; Tezner,
DAS .EmE EaaEssmx DER VERWALTUNGSBEHORDEN (Vienna, 1924).
